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Abstract 
The literature on international border disputes has in recent years focused increasingly on 
the role played by norm transition in promoting or facilitating new political compromises. This 
article explores the value of a specific model of norm replacement in accounting for the 
circumstances leading to Ireland’s Good Friday agreement in 1998, which formally and finally 
settled the long-running territorial dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom. Drawing 
on the theoretical literature, it identifies three phases in this process. First, from the creation 
of the Irish Free State in 1922 until the civil unrest in Northern Ireland peaked in 1972 the 
irredentist norm was substantially unchallenged. It was embedded in the 1937 constitution, 
which defined the national territory as extending over the whole island of Ireland—including 
Northern Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom. The second phase, from about 1972 to 1998, 
was one of norm competition. The irredentist norm was severely challenged by new political 
realities in Northern Ireland, and was potentially destabilising for the state itself. It was 
increasingly challenged by an alternative ‘consent’ norm, one embracing in effect the 
geopolitical status quo. The third phase, from 1998 onwards, was one of consolidation of the 
new norm, now written into the Irish constitution to replace the wording of 1937. The article 
suggests that this model plays a valuable role in accounting for the changing status of the 
Irish border, but also that the Irish experience has implications for the broad shape of the 
model. 
Key words: partition, boundary disputes, territorial politics, Northern Ireland, United 
Kingdom, Republic of Ireland. 
Introduction 
How do states which share a disputed frontier come eventually to an accommodation on an 
agreed line of demarcation? An important recent review of the nexus between borders, 
conflict and trade concluded that, while significant advances have been made in explaining 
the endurance of territorial disputes between states, it is much more difficult to account for 
the factors that facilitate the resolution of conflicts of this kind (Schultz, 2015: 141). This 
article considers one such protracted stand-off that came to a sudden end: the British-Irish 
dispute over the territory of Northern Ireland. This case is an important one because of its 
longevity (extending from 1922 to 1998), its intensity (marked by profoundly diverging 
nationalist values, sharply clashing constitutional claims, and a violent conflict that resulted in 
hundreds of deaths in the 1920s and thousands in the period 1968-98), and its geopolitical 
location (in the otherwise relatively peaceful northwestern corner of Europe). It also raises 
challenging theoretical questions: about the structure of elite-driven ideology (the mechanics 
of ideological shift and the character of elite discourse), about the nature of borders (their 
permeability or otherwise, and their symbolic and substantive significance), and about the 
character of any settlement (whether definitive, transitional, or inherently unstable). 
This article tries to account for the outcome in the Irish case in the context of current 
comparative research in this area, and to explore its implications for this literature. It begins 
by examining recent findings on the resolution of territorial border disputes that offer insights 
into the Northern Irish case. It continues by outlining the range of geopolitical models that 
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have been at the core of efforts at settlement. It goes on to look at the process by which the 
Irish political elite apparently moved from a preference for one of these models to a 
preference for another quite different one in three phases: from independence in 1922 to the 
collapse of Northern Ireland’s self-governing institutions in 1972, from then to the Good 
Friday agreement of 1998, and in the aftermath of the agreement. It concludes by assessing 
the contribution of this case to broader comparative models of territorial conflict resolution. 
Of necessity, the article minimises discussion of an important background factor: the 
historical relationship of political dependence of Dublin on London, a matter of obvious 
importance up to 1936, but not devoid of significance since then. It also avoids addressing a 
core problem, the intercommunal conflict in Northern Ireland, except when this impinges on 
the cross-border tension analysed here.1 It also focuses, again with a view to ensuring the 
manageability of the topic, on the perspective of the Republic of Ireland rather than of the 
United Kingdom (on changing British perspectives, see Tannam, 2001; Todd, 2014, 2016b). 
Legitimising disputed boundaries 
At a time when it was thought that the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union would result in a proliferation of territorial disputes, observers expressed 
surprise that the ultimate outcome was so peaceful. The highly visible human and economic 
costs of the turmoil in such cases as Ukraine (Dragneva and Solczuk, 2015: 100-106) have 
distracted attention from the reality that there have been far fewer territorial disputes than 
might have been expected. Forsberg (1998: 437-8) has identified three approaches to 
explaining this, corresponding approximately to liberal, realist and constructivist perspectives. 
The first sees the drive for territorial expansion as being undermined by relationships 
between ‘trading states’, where trade relations take priority. Second, power relations may 
render conflict less desirable, reducing the incentives for continuing conflict in circumstances 
where neither side is prepared to budge. Third, new identity patterns may serve to legitimise 
the territorial status quo (Forsberg, 1998: 437-8). 
‘Liberal’ or economic arguments may indeed have a role to play, but it is a paradoxical one in 
the Irish case. It seems clear that the prospect of joint economic gains incentivises 
settlement (Schultz, 2015: 141), and that opportunities in the areas of trade, investment, 
travel and tourism encourage the normalisation of political relations (Simmons, 2005: 843). 
The sheer military and financial costs of maintaining a dispute further reduce the 
attractiveness of this course of action to the challenging state (Wiegand, 2011: 279-80). At 
first sight, though, the broad shape of the Irish-British economic relationship gives the lie to 
this. Trading and other economic links between the two states were remarkably high from the 
1920s to the 1960s, with massive Irish trade dependence on the UK; this dependence fell 
below 50% in respect of both exports and imports only in the1970s (Bradley, 2007: 66-67). 
But Irish irredentist rhetoric was at its height during the first period, and began to soften only 
during the 1970s, precisely as Irish dependence on the British market fell. Close trade 
relationships and economic exchange, it seems, may promote, and be facilitated by, political 
normalisation; but they will not of themselves necessarily prevent interstate conflict. 
Realist arguments suggest that neither side to a territorial boundary dispute has much to gain 
from prolonged stalemate (Simmons, 2005: 827). Predictability in the international territorial 
order is also desirable from the perspective of neighbouring states (Zacher, 2001: 234-5), 
and in any case international law has been moving in the direction of stressing the legitimacy 
of existing territorial borders (Abulof, 2016; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). It seems likely that 
the Irish-British relationship has not been immune from this pressure to settle, a pressure 
that would have been all the more immediate and explicit after the two states became fellow-
members of the EU in 1973 (Hayward, 2006, 2009; McCall, 2011, 2014; Tannam, 2007a). 
The constructivist position focuses on changing mass and elite attitudes. One influential 
approach to the explanation of the role of new norms in international relations suggests that 
they pass through a life cycle with three stages: (1) emergence, as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ try 
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to persuade a critical mass of other actors to accept their new norm, (2) acceptance, as the 
new norm acquires a dominant position, characterised by ‘cascading’ support from a growing 
number of actors, often marked by a ‘tipping point’ at which support from a critical mass of 
actors has been achieved, and (3) internalisation, where the norm has been so fully accepted 
that it no longer needs to be articulated frequently, but is simply taken for granted 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). This framework has been used to account for the 
manner in which the norm of territorial integrity (the notion that existing state boundaries 
should be accepted) has gained general acceptance, through (1) emergence of the notion of 
respect for the territorial integrity of existing states, expressed initially in the League of 
Nations Covenant, (2) acceptance of this principle in such documents as the UN Charter 
(1945), and subsequent endorsement by most states, and (3) strengthening of this norm 
from 1976 onwards, and universal adherence to it in international relations (Zacher, 2001: 
236-7). 
This model may be used not just to account not only for the emergence of new international 
norms advocated by states but also for the emergence of new policy norms advanced by 
groups and individuals within states. A very similar three-stage approach, based on patterns 
of argumentation at elite level, has been used to explain acceptance of the territorial status 
quo norm at national level, illustrated by the Irish case. This again identified three stages in 
the war of ideas: (1) innovative argumentation, which questions the accepted norm as 
existing realities shift, often triggered by a revolutionary event and marked by a ‘cognitive 
punch’ (which makes it clear that ‘old ways of doing things are obsolete and have to be 
replaced by something new’), (2) persuasive argumentation, in which a compelling link 
between the new norm and actors’ everyday experiences is established, and (3) compromise 
with remaining opponents of the new norm, who are overwhelmed by the dominance of the 
new majority viewpoint and are unwilling to pay the costs of opposing it (Kornprobst, 2007a: 
70-71, 78). In the Irish case, the old norm rested on a profound commitment in the South to 
the territorial claim over Northern Ireland, with those who broke this taboo vilified as traitors. 
The outbreak of civil unrest in 1968 was the ‘revolutionary event’ that made it clear that ‘the 
old ways of doing things had become obsolete’, and advocates of the new norm—the 
territorial status quo—were able to bring large segments of the elites and the general public 
along with them. Finally, the new norm was embedded in the Good Friday agreement in 
1998 and fully accepted in the Republic, with opponents bending to the new dominant view 
(Kornprobst, 2007a: 72, 92-3). 
There is, then, a prima facie case for using the Irish experience to test this set of 
generalisations, and to do so by recognising three phases. The first, from independence in 
1922 down to the early 1970s, was one in which the irredentist norm was dominant. The 
period from then until about 1998 was one of competition between this norm and an 
alternative that was relatively new to Ireland, that of the territorial status quo. The decisive 
victory of the latter in the 1998 negotiations has been marked by the subsequent near-
disappearance of its competitor. 
Geopolitical models of dispute management 
It has been argued that, apart from a few circumstances such as when one state leases part 
of another, conflicts over territory are primarily zero-sum, in that ‘usually only one entity can 
control a piece of land’ (Goertz and Diehl, 1992: 51). While this may reflect the rhetoric of the 
states which are parties to the dispute, alternative compromise strategies are available, 
including fair division, joint management and the creation of neutral, buffer or demilitarised 
zones (Guo, 2012: 85-30). Partition and joint rule are thus alternatives to handing a disputed 
territory to one of the two claimant states. Repartition was on the Irish political agenda in the 
early 1920s (with nationalist leaders expecting that a boundary commission would make 
substantial territorial awards to the South). Though abandoned in 1925, the idea of repartition 
resurfaced occasionally in the 1970s and 1980s (see Kennedy, 1990). 
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The notion of shared authority was particularly important in the Irish case, since it assisted 
the compromise reached in 1998. Because of the important role they played in facilitating 
inter-state compromise, it is important to consider further models that sought to undermine 
the zero-sum perception of what was at stake (for an overview of approaches, see Wolff, 
2003: 16-33). Figure 1 presents schematically the range of relationships that may emerge. In 
principle, in disputes over territory X between states Y and Z, four types of outcome are 
possible: either Y or Z gains (or retains) control, or both do (sharing sovereignty over X), or 
neither does (X becomes independent). It is, however, also possible to envisage certain 
intermediate categories, as the figure shows. 
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In very many cases, incumbent state Y exercises direct control over disputed territory X, as 
in interwar Czechoslovakia’s rule over the predominantly German-speaking districts of 
Bohemia and Moravia (position A; Wiskemann, 1967: 97-139). Often, though, the incumbent 
sovereign makes significant concessions to the disputed territory as a gesture to the 
challenging claimant and to circumstances in the disputed territory, as in Finland’s 
concession in 1920 of very substantial autonomy to the Åland Islands, with their cultural and 
historical links to Sweden (position B; Hepburn, 2014). Mirroring these positions, claimant 
state Z may win complete control over the disputed territory, which it then administers as an 
integral part of the state (position G), as in the French annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1918 
(Wolff, 2003: 39-79). In other circumstances, while the claimant state achieves overall control 
of territory X, it concedes substantial autonomy to that state, as in South Tyrol in Italy (which 
moved from position G to position F, with its special status recognised in stages; Grote, 
2012; Wolff, 2008). In between these, positions C, D and E represent balanced compromises 
between the two claimant states, differing only in the level of autonomy conferred on the 
disputed territory. The two states may both entirely surrender sovereignty over territory X, as 
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Germany and Poland did in respect of the Free City of Danzig after 1920 (position C; 
Oberdörfer, 2014); they may continue to exercise at least nominal sovereignty over a self-
governing territory, as in the titular sovereignty of the French President and the Bishop of 
Urgell in Spain over Andorra after 1993 (position D; Wolff, 2003: 197-9); or they may rule the 
disputed territory jointly and directly, as the British and French did in respect of the New 
Hebrides (now Vanuatu) up to 1980 (position E; Wolff, 2003: 200-205; see also Samuels, 
2007). 
In the context of British and Irish claims to Northern Ireland, these positions translate into a 
set of clearly recognisable policy stances, most of which were identified at an early stage in 
the literature on the Northern Ireland conflict (Rose, 1976: 139-66; McGarry and O’Leary, 
1990: 269-89; Whyte, 1990: 209-43). 
A. Integration within the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland (X) is governed as an integral part 
of the incumbent state (Y). Though widely canvassed, especially by unionists in the 1980s, 
this position has been emphatically rejected by the British government; the whole thrust of 
constitutional evolution in the UK since the late twentieth century has been away from 
integration. However, something close to this, direct rule, has been the default British 
position, implemented pragmatically in 1972-73, 1974-99 and 2002-07. It is a conceivable 
long-term constitutional option that differs from integration in that Northern Ireland would 
continue with its own distinct corpus of laws and administrative arrangements (Aughey, 1989: 
132-167; Roberts, 1987). 
B. Devolution within the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland forms part of the United Kingdom, 
with which it has a federative relationship: the UK government controls foreign affairs, 
defence and certain other services, while the Northern Ireland government controls domestic 
services, as in the case of the component members of federations. This is the position that 
obtained from 1921 to 1972 (based on the principle of majority rule in Northern Ireland) and 
in 1974, 1999-2002 and from 2007 to the present (now based on consociation within 
Northern Ireland, and with a higher level of British involvement; see Knox, 2010: 7-46; 
Aughey, 1989: 99-131). 
C. An independent Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is independent of both the Republic of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. Under the premiership of Lord Brookeborough (1943-63), 
the Northern Ireland government briefly considered leaving the UK and joining the 
Commonwealth, and an independent Northern Ireland was actively considered by certain 
unionist politicians in the mid-1970s—notably by the breakaway Vanguard Unionist Party. 
This option was also contemplated by Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1974-75, 
though had this been pursued it is likely that Wilson would have pressed the Irish 
government to assume responsibility for Northern Ireland. Variants include a unilateral 
declaration of independence (favoured by some unionists in the 1970s), and negotiated 
independence, with continuing British subsidies (Moore and Crimmins, 1990). 
D. Devolution with joint British-Irish rule. Institutions of government within Northern Ireland 
(whether based on majoritarian or consociational principles) exercise the functions outlined in 
B above; sovereign responsibility is shared by the British and Irish governments. This was 
advocated by the SDLP as a transitional mechanism towards Irish unity (1972), and was 
considered as a long-term solution by the all-party New Ireland Forum (1984) in the 
Republic. It was analysed from an academic perspective by Dent (1988) and Kenny (1990), 
and O’Leary et al (1993: 23-49) elaborated a detailed model with significant domestic input. 
E. Direct British-Irish condominium. Sovereign responsibility is shared by the British and Irish 
governments, without any devolved institutions within Northern Ireland. This has attracted 
support from the same sources as D (for a variant, see Hayes, 1998). 
F. Devolution within a united Ireland. Northern Ireland forms part of the Republic, with which 
it has a federative relationship. This is the mirror-image of B, and was the solution overtly 
preferred by de Valera and written into the 1937 constitution: Westminster would transfer its 
sovereign powers to Dublin. The New Ireland Forum presented a variant of this: a new all-
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Irish state would be created as a symmetrical federation (or even confederation), with the two 
component parts of equal status (for a critique, see Palley, 1990: 93-94). In yet another 
variant, Sinn Féin’s Eire Nua policy (1971) also proposed a symmetrical federation based on 
the four historical provinces, with Northern Ireland expanding to be replaced by the province 
of Ulster. 
G. A unitary Irish state. Northern Ireland is governed as an integral part of the Republic. This 
is the mirror-image of A, and was the implicit preference of pre-partition Sinn Féin, and, 
under pressure from Charles Haughey and his Fianna Fáil party, it was adopted as the 
preferred option of the New Ireland Forum. Advocated by many traditional nationalists, it has 
been elaborated by Anthony Coughlan (1990), who pointed out that constitutional 
amendment could also allow for island-level power sharing, at least on a transitional basis. 
These positions may appear complex, but in reality they oversimplify the range of available 
options. In the triangle in figure 1, the sides CA and CG, and the median line CE, are each a 
continuum, rather than, as presented here, a three-point scale (all power – some power – no 
power); a particular settlement may move along them by degrees. Furthermore, particular 
political settlements may lie between these lines rather than on them; the structures 
established by the Good Friday agreement, for instance, lie somewhere in the middle of the 
quadrilateral ABDE rather than matching any of the positions identified there (here, position 
H has been suggested). It should also be noted that this framework focuses on the formal 
balance of power; it ignores the significance of other factors such as de facto asymmetrical 
power relationships between states (a consideration of particular importance in the British-
Irish relationship) and the impact of co-membership of larger geopolitical entities such as the 
EU, which compromise the sovereignty of each state and transform the nature of the border 
between them (Coakley and O’Dowd, 2007; Tannam, 2007b). 
The unity norm 
For the first five decades of the life of the new Irish state, the norm of Irish unity remained 
supreme, at least at the rhetorical level. The ‘home rule’ (devolution) programme of the 
(mainly Catholic) Irish Nationalist Party, which had dominated the politics of the island since 
the 1880s, had fallen foul of powerful Protestant opposition concentrated in the North East. 
When the Nationalist Party was overwhelmed in 1918 by a more radical force, the separatist 
Sinn Féin party, the problem of reaching an accommodation with the North East was passed 
on, but now in a more demanding form, since the stakes were higher: nationalist demands 
for devolution had been replaced by demands for independence. The ultimate outcome was 
partition of the island, introduced as part of a devolution settlement in 1921, with the North 
East becoming a devolved region of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland. Devolution 
proved ineffective in the South; instead, a new settlement, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 
negotiated by the Sinn Féin leadership and the British government, allowed it to leave the 
United Kingdom, to become a British dominion modelled on Canada, known as the Irish Free 
State. 
The line of the boundary that separated the Free State from its now truncated parent state, 
the United Kingdom, was objectionable to Irish nationalists for two main reasons. First, it 
violated what they saw as the ‘historic national territory’, the home of the Irish, the island of 
Ireland—an expression of classic nationalist attachment to a specific area, regardless of its 
ethnic make-up, comparable with that associated with other nationalist movements, such as 
those of the Czechs, Finns, Lithuanians and Hungarians (Coakley, 2012: 109-111). Second, 
the line of the Irish border was manifestly biased, in that it diverged substantially from the 
(already imprecise) ethnic frontier (Rankin, 2007: 910-16). The territory that was allowed to 
opt out of the Free State was enlarged to include not just two overwhelmingly Protestant 
counties, but also four mixed ones, in two of which Catholics outnumbered Protestants, 
resulting in an overall Catholic minority of 34%. 
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Two provisions of the 1921 Treaty that immediately called the status of the border into 
question ironically had the long-term effect of consolidating it. First, provision was made for a 
Council of Ireland, representing the two parts of island, that would initially have limited 
powers, but with capacity to expand these. Second, the line of the border would be examined 
by a boundary commission, whose terms of reference enjoined it to take account of ‘the 
wishes of the inhabitants’; but only ‘in so far as may be compatible with economic and 
geographic conditions’, a phrase whose meaning was unclear (Blake, 1996). Ultimately, the 
commission adopted a very conservative approach, favouring only minor adjustments to the 
line of the border; and the Council of Ireland, never popular with nationalists because it 
symbolised partition and gave unionists undue influence, never came into existence. A 
tripartite conference between the British, Irish and Northern Irish prime ministers in 1925 
agreed to leave the existing border unaltered and to abandon the Council of Ireland. 
The political history of the first 15 years of the Irish Free State was dominated by efforts to 
assert its complete independence, even if this was at the cost of hardening the border. These 
were accompanied by vocal denunciations of partition and demands for Irish unity, led 
initially by the pro-Treaty wing of Sinn Féin (now Fine Gael), and then by its successor in 
government in 1932, Fianna Fáil, the long-standing dominant force in Irish politics.2 The party 
leader, de Valera, devised a distinctive formula for unity, one which he outlined initially during 
the debates on the Treaty in 1921-22, but which continued to be party policy until the 1960s: 
London would transfer its sovereign powers over Northern Ireland to Dublin, but devolved 
institutions would continue to function in Belfast. 
The constitution of the Irish Free State (adopted in 1922, and explicitly subject to the 1921 
Treaty) was a further target of de Valera He secured enactment of a new constitution in 
1937, one presented as a foundation document comparable with other revolutionary 
constitutions (see Ackerman, 1992: 49-50). As well as renaming the state ‘Ireland’ (it was not 
designated a republic until 1949), it boldly asserted the territorial integrity of the island of 
Ireland, in articles whose substantive significance is less clear than their symbolic import: 
Article 2. The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands 
and the territorial seas. 
Article 3. Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice 
to the right of the parliament and government established by this constitution to 
exercise jurisdiction over the whole territory, the laws enacted by the parliament 
shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann 
[the Irish Free State] and the like extra-territorial effect. 
But very little of substance followed. The unexpected decision in 1948 to proclaim Ireland a 
republic was made by a Fine Gael-led coalition, and took effect at the same time as a flurry 
of anti-partition activity. This included foreign tours by de Valera denouncing the evils of 
partition in 1948-51, and the creation of an All-Party Anti-Partition Conference in 1949. This 
produced a number of propagandist works, including a substantial volume in the name of its 
secretary, Frank Gallagher (1957). Its views on partition were predictable: it was a ‘denial of 
the right to self-determination’—a refusal, imposed and supported by the British government, 
to accept the will of a majority of the people of Ireland (All-Party Anti-Partition Conference, 
1949: 16). 
Although there were signs of a thaw in the North-South relationship in the 1960s, with 
reciprocal visits by the Irish and Northern Irish prime ministers to Belfast and Dublin 
respectively in 1965, distaste for the border remained deeply ingrained. The dilemma was 
illustrated in the terms of office of prime ministers Sean Lemass (1959-66) and Jack Lynch 
(1966-73). The former tried to quietly reconcile two positions: offering de facto recognition to 
Northern Ireland while retaining the territorial claim. The latter, faced with the reality of civil 
unrest across the border and pressure to intervene, vacillated between condemning partition 
and stressing the need to reach agreement with Northern Ireland. 
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Norm competition 
By the late 1960s, then, the irredentist line was already being challenged by alternative 
viewpoints, even if these were still on the political margins. But the outbreak of civil unrest in 
Northern Ireland that began in late 1968 illustrated the consequences of the generous 
territory with which Northern Ireland had been endowed in the 1920s: the Catholic minority 
had increased to 37% of the population by 1971, and its age structure indicated that this 
proportion was likely to grow further (in fact, by 2011 the proportion of the population from a 
Catholic background was 45%; Coakley, 2015: 41-5). This minority suffered structural 
disadvantage as well as being discriminated against by successive unionist governments. 
The classical Westminster government-opposition system resulted in permanent exclusion 
from office of the leaders of the Catholic community, represented mainly by the Nationalist 
Party until 1969, and by the new Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) subsequently. 
Alongside this, a new Sinn Féin party and its ally, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), began a 
campaign to destabilise the state and ultimately to procure a united Ireland. The suspension 
of Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions and the introduction of direct British rule in 1972 
made necessary the pursuit of a new accommodation, and the British government made it 
clear that this would be based on unionist-nationalist power sharing and institutionalised links 
with the Republic. When a deal was finally put in place at the Sunningdale conference in 
December 1973, it thus included a new Council of Ireland. 
The political and socio-economic realities exposed by these changes stimulated new thinking 
on Northern Ireland, forcing the Irish government to reconsider its stance on Irish unity and 
pushing the governing party, Fianna Fáil, into undertaking a fundamental re-evaluation of its 
policy (O’Donnell, 2007: 21-46; Ó Beacháin, 2010; Kelly, 2013: 295-365). A significant 
reconsideration of Northern Ireland policy also began within the two main opposition parties, 
which, in any case, had been moving steadily away from the traditional nationalist consensus 
(Ivory, 1999: 89-90; McDermott, 2014: 102). The southern parties’ steep learning curve was 
marked not so much by a single ‘cognitive punch’ as by a set of cognitive body-blows, 
followed by two near-knockouts. The inadequacy of traditional irredentist rhetoric was 
exposed by a series of developments that forced southern elites to undertake a fundamental 
reappraisal: 
• The incontrovertible fact, demonstrated in a series of elections whose fairness could not 
be questioned, that a big majority in Northern Ireland rejected the nationalist vision, and 
was passionately committed to defence of the union and maintenance of partition (Rose, 
1971: 188-202) 
• The new path taken by Northern Ireland nationalists, of whom some were apparently 
happy to settle for a reformed Northern Ireland, while others were prepared to engage in a 
violent struggle to achieve Irish unity, an approach at sharp variance with the position of 
successive Irish governments (McLoughlin, 2010: 1-5) 
• Resistance within the Irish civil service to yielding power and responsibility to pan-Irish 
political institutions and an apparent preference for the administrative status quo, with 
some departments seeing the Council of Ireland as ‘some kind of external threat to the 
institutions of the state’ (FitzGerald, 1991: 203) 
• The burden that would have to be assumed by the Republic in the event of Irish unity, with 
the financial costs alone threatening to impose a crippling load on the Irish exchequer—
about 14-15% to assume the cost of the British subsidy, and a further 41-44% if Irish 
public services were to be upgraded to Northern Ireland levels.3 
Two other developments fatally punctured the nationalist dream. First, unionists profoundly 
opposed to any change in the constitutional status quo still possessed sufficient resources to 
exercise a veto. A political general strike with paramilitary support resulted in the collapse of 
the new Sunningdale framework in May 1974, and exposed both the reluctance (or inability) 
of the British government to ensure that normal services would continue in the face of 
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determined unionist opposition, and the vulnerability of the Republic to loyalist attack (the 
worst single incident of the civil conflict, the murder of 33 people in the Dublin and Monaghan 
bombings of 17 May 1974, was designed to undermine Irish government support for the 
Sunningdale settlement). 
Second, Irish leaders discovered painfully the salience of the maxim ‘be careful what you 
wish for’: there were clear signs that the British government was contemplating withdrawal 
from Northern Ireland in 1974-75, an outcome with which the Irish government believed it 
would be unable to cope, and which the Foreign Affairs minister described as a ‘disaster’ 
(FitzGerald, 2006: 150). Ironically, the prospect of achieving Ireland’s irredentist claim was by 
now a source of worry to the very people who had argued so vociferously for it. 
Not surprisingly, then, the Irish government moved in the mid-1970s to a relatively clearly 
defined policy on Northern Ireland, one it shared in outline with the British government. As 
the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 had put it, change in the status of Northern Ireland could 
come about only with the consent of a majority there, implying acceptance of partition in the 
long term. This was, however, to be subject to two other constitutional principles: devolved 
government within Northern Ireland on the basis of power sharing between the two 
communities, and an institutionalised ‘Irish dimension’ linking Northern Ireland and the 
Republic. Both governments accepted that progress would be slow, given unionist rejection 
of the power-sharing arrangements (1974), the failure of a specially convened constitutional 
convention (1975-76), stalemate in inter-party talks (1980-81), and the reluctance of 
nationalists—and of many unionists—to engage in a new deliberative assembly (1982-86). 
The pursuit of a nationalist consensus on the question of partition continued. The most 
significant initiative was the New Ireland Forum of 1983-84, which brought together the three 
major southern parties and the SDLP in a fundamental reappraisal of traditional nationalist 
objectives. Its report identified three models: joint British-Irish authority over Northern Ireland, 
a federal or confederal Ireland, and a unitary Irish state. Its stated preference was for the last 
of these, adopted under pressure from Fianna Fáil leader Charles Haughey as the price for 
consensus on the Forum report. Nevertheless, in its recognition of political realities in 
Northern Ireland, the Forum has been hailed as marking ‘the beginnings of a profound 
change of mind and attitude on the part at least of one of the key parties in the imbroglio’, 
nationalist Ireland (MacDonagh, 1985: 169). 
Other types of compromise on the Irish-UK border entered the discussion frame during this 
period. One was a form of repartition that would draw a new line between ‘British Ulster’ and 
‘Irish Ulster’, though this would leave big minorities on either side (Kennedy, 1990). The 
second was a British proposal for a new frontier zone—a buffer zone within which both 
British and Irish security services could operate. This was, however, rejected by the Irish 
government on the basis that it would aggravate rather than assist already complex cross-
border security arrangements (see FitzGerald, 1991: 474-5). 
This emerging consensus among southern leaders on a much more modest geopolitical 
formula was reflected in subsequent developments. Following initial rejection of all three 
Forum options by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, a radical new approach was 
devised in the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985: the Irish government was given a formal voice 
in the affairs of Northern Ireland through a new, standing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference served by a permanent secretariat comprising British and Irish civil servants. 
Once again, these structures were underpinned by an implicit recognition of the status of 
Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Opinion within the major parties quickly 
consolidated around the ‘principle of consent’, with even Fianna Fáil amending its 
constitution to reflect this. These changes were reflected in the work of the Forum for Peace 
and Reconciliation, created in Dublin in 1994 to involve Sinn Féin in the discussion process. 
Although consensus was not forthcoming (since Sinn Féin held out for a more nationalist 
position), its draft final report implied support of the constitutional status quo, in that it 
supported the notion that ‘the exercise of self-determination is a matter for agreement 
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between the people of Ireland and must be based on consent’ (Forum for Peace and 
Reconciliation, 1996: Present realities (k)). Endorsement of the reassuringly positive 
principles of ‘self-determination’ and ‘consent’, does not resolve the difficult and essentially 
political question as to how these principles should be implemented; as Sir Ivor Jennings 
(1956: 55-6) warned decades ago, ‘the people cannot decide until somebody decides who 
are the people’. 
Norm replacement 
The new consensus achieved in the Good Friday agreement of 1998 (one to which Sinn Féin 
now assented) represented a decisive change in the Republic of Ireland’s relationship with 
the UK (Cauvet, 2011). It was accompanied by a kind of ideological ‘dejustification’ of the 
traditional irredentist position (Kornprobst, 2007b). To start with, it endorsed the land border 
with the UK with striking solemnity, not merely formally recognising it but amending the Irish 
constitution to guarantee it. It replaced the irredentist articles 2 and 3 by explicit acceptance 
of the existing border, ‘recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by 
peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in 
both jurisdictions in the island’. It is true that it also provided a mechanism for bringing Irish 
unity about, but that was a formal gesture without any prospect of short- or medium-term 
realisation. On the other hand, the agreement did not simply endorse the existing line of the 
international border; it also made provision for the special status of Northern Ireland, 
recognising its binational character, and providing for power-sharing institutions, links to the 
Republic, and other structural changes that expressed the equality of the two traditions. 
Since we are concerned here primarily with the Republic of Ireland, the extent to which the 
agreement found favour outside its borders is of indirect rather than direct relevance. It 
seems clear, though, that British governments were satisfied with the outcome; they had in 
any case for long been neutral on the status of Northern Ireland and committed themselves 
in 1973 to assist the process of Irish unity should a majority there so wish. Within Northern 
Ireland, unionists were initially divided about the agreement, but most of those who objected 
were satisfied by the supplementary St Andrews agreement in 2006. Nationalist opinion was 
overwhelmingly in favour: the agreement was very close to the SDLP’s own thinking, and 
even Sinn Féin has stressed its theoretical border-transforming provisions rather than its 
geopolitically conservative substantive import. 
In the Republic, support for the agreement in the 1998 referendum was overwhelming—94% 
voted ‘yes’ to the constitutional amendment—no doubt assisted by the creative manner in 
which traditional vocabulary was overhauled so that it could be presented as promoting ‘the 
core ideals of Irish nationalism’ (Hayward, 2004: 33). General acceptance of the agreement 
as definitive is reflected in the absence of debate, during or between election campaigns, on 
Northern Ireland-related matters, and in the routine implementation of the agreement’s 
provisions for North-South cooperation. As former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, who played a 
central role in negotiating the agreement, put it, the matter is now closed, and even majority 
support for unity within Northern Ireland would of itself be insufficient to trigger a start to the 
unification process (Coakley, 2015: 51). 
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By the early twenty-first century, it appeared that consensus had been reached within the 
Republic of Ireland on the status of the border. The general election of 2016 showed virtually 
no support for ‘dissident’ republicans, a result mirrored in the 2016 election to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. Levels of politically related violent crime had fallen dramatically by 
comparison with the late twentieth century. Security monitoring reports indicated that former 
paramilitary groups had either dissolved or been redirected into other pursuits, such as 
conventional political activity or ‘ordinary’ crime. Opinion polls showed continuing support for 
the status quo, though with many still endorsing support for Irish unity in the long term. The 
extent to which public opinion in Northern Ireland had moved in a geopolitically conservative 
direction is illustrated in figure 2, which shows continued overwhelming Protestant support for 
the Union, but with an increasing proportion of Catholics (by 2010, a majority) also moving to 
this position.4 
 
Figure 2. Northern Ireland: support for the Union by religious background, 1989-2014 
 
Note: Responses are to the question ‘What do you think the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be?’, 
with ‘remain part of the United Kingdom’ as the option reported here. In 2007 the ‘pro-UK’ response option was 
divided into two: ‘with direct rule’ and ‘with devolved government’. 
Source: Northern Ireland Social Attitudes surveys, 1989-1996; Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 1998-
2014; data available www.ark.ac.uk/nilt 
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This asymmetry in attitudes within Northern Ireland is also to be seen if we look at the 
intensity of the positions taken. Catholic opponents of the Union, figure 3 suggests, are 
prepared to live with the status quo, if not actually welcoming it; only 3%, on average, for the 
period reported here, would find permanent failure to achieve Irish unity ‘almost impossible to 
accept’. Protestant opponents of Irish unity, however, are much more committed to their 
position, with 22% reporting Irish unity as ‘almost impossible to accept’. This suggests a 
continuing powerful basis of support within Northern Ireland for the status quo associated 
with the border, with proponents of traditional irredentism thoroughly marginalised (hardened 
dissidents of this kind have been evocatively labelled ‘norm antipreneurs’; Bloomfield, 2016: 
311). 
Northern Ireland as a disputed frontier zone 
This article has paid little attention to the perspective of one of the two international parties to 
the Northern Ireland conflict—the United Kingdom, which, as the incumbent state, actually 
controls Northern Ireland. Notwithstanding the gap between British and Irish priorities that 
was so pronounced a feature of the negotiation process, tense moments in these negotiation 
were sometimes examples of shadow boxing, and sometimes real instances of 
disagreement—but most were potentially resolvable. Shortly before the most fundamental 
institutional concession by the British, the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985, Prime Minister 
Thatcher remarked that ‘the Irish want more than we can give and always will’.5 In reality, 
though, there were times when the British were prepared to give more than the Irish were 
prepared to accept. There was a long tradition of sympathy for Irish nationalism in the British 
Labour Party, and by 1973 the Conservative Party had also arrived at a point where 
generous concessions to Irish nationalism were possible. This transition was facilitated by 
the tendency to see Northern Ireland as a last vestige of empire—a territory with which, 
unlike Scotland and Wales, the state could comfortably part. The colonial ideology that had 
been such a safeguard for Northern Ireland at the beginning of the twentieth century had 
 
Figure 3. Northern Ireland: resistance to least preferred option by religious background, 
1989-2014 
 
Note: Responses are to the question (for Protestant respondents not supporting Irish unity) ‘If the majority of 
people in Northern Ireland ever voted to become part of a United Ireland do you think you would find this almost 
impossible to accept?’, and (for Catholic respondents not supporting the union) ‘If the majority of people in 
Northern Ireland never voted to become part of a United Ireland do you think you would find this almost 
impossible to accept?’. 
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 1998-2014; data available www.ark.ac.uk/nilt 
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suffered a ‘normative death’ by the century’s end (see Panke and Petersohn, 2016: 14-15). 
Furthermore, retraction from empire was accompanied by a ‘signalling’ system that 
highlighted the possibility of further withdrawal (see Chad and Owsiak, 2016: 427)—a 
reassuring sing to opponents of British rule. 
It was, then, primarily on the Irish side that ideological shift was so dramatically evident. The 
process of normalisation matched closely the model of inter-state conflict resolution over 
international borders outlined at the beginning of this article. Indeed, the three phases 
discussed here were reflected in three episodes of fully-fledged cross-party consultation: the 
All-Party Anti-Partition Conference (1948-73) with its uncritical acceptance of the irredentist 
norm, the New Ireland Forum (1983-84) as host of a debate on the merits of competing 
norms, and the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (1994-96) with its implicit acceptance of 
the status quo norm. In its first phase, the irredentist norm was deeply embedded in elite 
discourse and in public opinion. The outbreak of civil unrest in Northern Ireland after 1968, 
however, delivered a series of ‘cognitive punches’ to this norm: it appeared to ignore the 
reality of northern unionist opinion, to be unaware of the subtle changes in northern 
nationalist attitudes, to take for granted popular and elite support in the Republic, and to fail 
to consider the enormous costs—financial and other—of change in the status quo. In 
particular, the Ulster Workers’ Council strike in 1974 that brought down the Sunningdale 
agreement and the very real prospect that the British government would withdraw from 
Northern Ireland represented a cognitive knock-out. 
The great alternative to the irredentist norm was, as in other such disputes, the status quo—
in the Irish case, hidden behind ‘the principle of consent’. From its first hesitant articulation at 
Sunningdale in 1973, this principle steadily asserted itself as the new norm. It was possible 
to disguise the reality of the gap between the two norms by arguing that they were mutually 
compatible. While this was the case in theory, empirical realities suggested that unity would 
not be brought about by agreement. Nevertheless, in a choice between a combination of 
irredentism with violence and a combination of the territorial status quo with democratic 
decision making, the latter was likely to win a rapid victory. It seems clear that the political 
violence of the 1970s and 1980s pushed public and elite opinion in the Republic decisively in 
the direction of support for the territorial status quo. The New Ireland Forum of 1983-84 may 
well have represented the ‘tipping point’ in this respect, since it forced even adherents of 
traditional irredentism to come to terms with a new political world—an adjustment that 
culminated in the victory of the new norm with the Good Friday agreement of 1998. 
Apparently insignificant gestures and words often symbolise major changes. The Anglo-Irish 
agreement of 1985 was, like earlier treaties between Dublin and London, drawn up ‘in two 
originals’, rather than (as with other international treaties) ‘in duplicate’. While the content of 
the body of the text was identical, the Irish version was labelled a treaty between ‘the 
Government of Ireland’ and ‘the Government of the United Kingdom’. The British version, 
however, was entitled a treaty between ‘the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland’ and ‘the Government of the Republic of Ireland’. The gap in 
respect of territorial claims was such that the two sides could not agree even on the 
designation of the other state (Coakley, 2009). The 1998 Good Friday agreement changed 
that; the subsequent enabling treaty was designated by both sides as being between ‘the 
Government of Ireland’ and ‘the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’, signalling full normalisation of the international border. 
Conclusion 
As suggested above, ‘liberal’ or economic approaches are of limited value in accounting for 
the Irish-British settlement. Realist interpretations have more to offer, and can be 
accommodated within the constructivist approach adopted here. It has been argued above 
that the norm competition model offers an invaluable insight into the process of evolution by 
which the Republic of Ireland accepted the existing land border with the United Kingdom, but 
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this case study also has important implications for the model itself. Six important findings 
may be highlighted. 
The first is the phenomenon of ideological reversal: elites and opinion formers are driven to 
assume new ideological positions almost in the manner of Paul on the road to Damascus. 
The ‘cognitive punch’ that leads to reassessment of the original norm may be more like a 
‘cognitive knock-out’ at the end of a bruising encounter. The Irish government and political 
elites were forced in the early 1970s to encounter uncomfortable existing circumstances and 
new realities that rendered the irredentist claim not just of questionable strategic value but 
also of menacing import for the state itself: the Republic of Ireland was simply in no condition 
to assume responsibility for the economic and security costs of Northern Ireland. This 
undermined the irredentist demand more speedily and effectively than would otherwise have 
been explicable—perhaps aided by the capacity of elites to hide the extent of pragmatic shift 
from their more conservative supporters, as in elite-mass tensions about foreign policy 
elsewhere among Europe’s neutral states (Beyer and Hofmann, 2011: 291). 
Second, notwithstanding the sharp changes just described, a negotiation process may 
feature incremental advance rather than sudden settlement. This is not a reference to 
creeping progress, but to step-wise agreement. It has been observed that many successful 
settlements have worked because they have operated in stages (referring to segments of the 
frontier), with settlement of one stage allowing negotiators to move on to the next (Mattes, 
2016). In complex settlements, such as that of Northern Ireland, the stages were not 
successive border segments, but themes, such as the British-Irish relationship, the North-
South relationship and relationships between the two communities within Northern Ireland, 
where separate negotiations, and even stages in negotiation, were possible. 
Third, conflicts can be redefined and moved from the political to the ‘metaconstitutional’ level 
in a form of discourse displacement: they can be resolved simply by being sidelined, or 
‘kicked upstairs’ to the level of constitutional abstraction. Stability can be secured in the 
absence of normalisation (seen as implying formal acceptance of the border). By the end of 
the 1960s a modus vivendi between Irish and British governments had already been 
reached. The territorial dispute could effectively be ignored apart from a few rare legal and 
social contexts. Territorial claims implied in names (such as ‘Ireland’, rejected by the British, 
and ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, rejected by the Irish) could be 
creatively overlooked by such formulas as completing international documents in two 
originals rather than in duplicate, and truncating the title of the head of state when official 
encounters were unavoidable (when the first ever official visit of an Irish President to Great 
Britain took place in 1993, she was referred to simply as ‘President Mary Robinson’, without 
mention of the state over which she presided). Membership of the EU since 1973 also 
contributed to a normalisation of relations such that the irritant of Ireland’s constitutional 
claim on part of the territory of the UK could effectively be ignored. There is no reason to 
assume that this approach could not have continued indefinitely, had it not been disturbed by 
the outbreak of civil unrest in Northern Ireland. Ireland’s territorial claim might have been 
formally retained but in practice marginalised as an historical anomaly, comparable with 
ornamental but vacuous claims in royal titles, such as that of the Swedish king until 1973 
(over the Goths and the Wends), or the British King until 1801 (when the title ‘King of France’ 
was formally renounced). 
Fourth, a territorial dispute is rarely, if ever, a matter of concern only to the parties to the 
conflict at international level; it may also be driven by frontier disturbance. The population of 
the disputed territory may be a vital actor—sometimes, perhaps, even more central a player 
than the contending powers. It was the outbreak of civil unrest in Northern Ireland that 
defined the context for the ‘cognitive punches’ that so effectively punctured the Irish 
irredentist norm. The views of the people of Northern Ireland are formally seen by the two 
governments as driving its future status, and the Good Friday agreement makes specific 
provision for this. If a pro-Irish unity majority were to emerge in a referendum, Northern 
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Ireland would move from position H to position J in figure 1, with the agreement now 
guaranteeing the position of the unionist minority. 
Fifth, boundary claims are not part of a zero-sum process; a disputed territory need not be 
included in its entirety in one state but rather is subject to a process of border reconstitution. 
It may be partitioned between the claimants, or the claimants may exercise joint sovereignty 
over it. In either case, the formula need not be one of finding a median compromise; the 
compromise may be tilted in favour of one state or the other, and, as the Northern Ireland 
case illustrates, a wide variety of innovative institutional mechanisms (including local power 
sharing) may form part of the settlement package. Furthermore, a ‘hard’ border may be made 
‘softer’. The British-Irish border has been transformed since 1998, as new institutions that 
promote cross-border cooperation and the impact of EU programmes render it less visible on 
the administrative, political and economic maps (Tannam, 2007b: 121-3; Coakley and 
O’Dowd, 2007: 882). 
Finally, a ‘settlement’ may deliver no more than contingent stability. Rather than being 
definitive, it may constitute essentially a formula for compromise, or, indeed, for geopolitical 
change. The Northern Ireland settlement is an example: it provides a flexible mechanism for 
territorial transfer should this be ‘democratically’ supported. But a transfer of territory might 
also occur for other reasons iin the Irish case, depending on the dynamics of internal British 
politics. In particular, the decision of British voters in June 2016 to leave the EU while the 
Republic of Ireland continues to be a member has reopened the question of the Irish border, 
raising a range of unpredictable possibilities (Tannam, 2016). Neither should the possibility of 
collapse of the 1998 agreement for other reasons be discounted: it has been plausibly 
argued that the agreement was insufficiently embedded in stable, widely accepted 
constitutional principles within Northern Ireland itself, relying instead on ad-hoc intervention 
by the British and Irish governments, a fragile formula that depends on continuous oversight 
from Dublin and London that is unlikely to be forthcoming (Todd, 2016a). 
This analysis of the displacement of the irredentist norm in Ireland by a territorial status quo 
one raises, then, important considerations for the construction of theoretical approaches to 
the resolution of international boundary disputes. Much of the literature obviously draws its 
inspiration from Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) path-breaking analysis of revolutionary processes in 
scientific research. There are important respects in which the three stages of the model used 
here to illuminate change in respect of the Irish border run parallel to the kind of paradigm 
shifts that Kuhn saw as driving scientific research, as an old paradigm increasingly failed to 
account satisfactorily for empirical reality, but was nevertheless adhered to until such time as 
an alternative paradigm proved more capable of coping with this reality. A central conclusion 
of Kuhn’s work was, however, that paradigm replacement is a continuing process. We would 
thus need to be careful not to conclude definitively that the displacement of the irredentist 
norm by the status quo one is the end of the story. 
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Notes 
1. The three sets of relationships (nationalist-unionist within Northern Ireland, North-South within 
the island of Ireland, and British-Irish) are inextricable, but governed by different dynamics; for 
an exploration of the extent to which the 1998 settlement was shaped by a rupture of path-
dependent patterns of ethnic competition, see Ruane and Todd, 2007. 
2. To set these parties in context, Fianna Fáil and its predecessor won 44% of all parliamentary 
seats over the period 1922–2016, Fine Gael and its main predecessor 33%, and the Labour 
Party 11%. The remaining 12% is accounted for by small parties and non-aligned deputies.  
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3. These estimates are for 1969; National Archives of Ireland, Interdepartmental Unit on Northern 
Ireland, Interim report (final version), June 1973, appendix 5: finances, TSCH/2004/21/624. 
4. A change in the options offered from 2007 onwards is likely to have inflated support for the 
Union. 
5. Charles Powell to Sir Robert Armstrong, 2 Jan. 1985, Prime Minister’s Papers, The National 
Archives (Kew), PREM 19/1548. 
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